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Humankind in Civilization’s Extended Order:
A Tragedy, The First Part
Bart J. Wilson*

This article is a short, scientific story of the labyrinthian
human career, of humankind’s place in the natural order of
the world, and of the evolution of moral rules and rule following that make the extended order of civilization possible.
Drawing upon work in anthropology, biology, and linguistics,
I weave a science-based narrative of how Homo sapiens
came to be the only primate to convert enemy aliens into
trading friends. It is a Goethean story of the human condition that postulates the common origins of and modern
tension between Pleistocene and Anthropocene morality. It is
also a Hayekian story of human universals and the uniqueness of our species that explicates some necessary but not
sufficient conditions for our prosperity.
Two souls, alas, are dwelling in my breast,
The one wants to separate from the other.
Faust, J.W. von Goethe1

* Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, contact information: bartwilson
@gmail.com. This paper has benefited from comments and suggestions from partici
pants at a conference “The Ends of Capitalism,” sponsored by the Classical Liberal
Institute at the New York University School of Law, on February 26–27, 2015.
For valuable comments on earlier drafts, I sincerely thank Gus Gradinger, Taylor
Jaworski, Erik Kimbrough, Jimmy Langner, Jan Osborn, Matt Ridley, Sarah Skwire,
Vernon Smith, Anna Wierzbicka, Brianna Asmus, Sarah Brosnan, Zach Dutra, and
Ryan Johnson.
1
J.W. von Goethe, Faust (Author’s literal translation).
© 2016 by the University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 978-0-226-16666-7/2016/0023-0003$10.00
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No longer the end pursued but the rules observed make the action
good or bad.
The Fatal Conceit, F.A. Hayek2

I. PRELUDE ON OUR SPECIES
Homo sapiens is the only species in the history of the planet to turn
its principal “hostile force of nature,” itself, into a friend. Homo sapiens is the only species in the history of the planet to deliberately
extend its own average life expectancy and intentionally decrease
its own rate of infant mortality. Homo sapiens is the only species in
the history of the planet to actualize healthier and more comfortable
lives for itself. Homo sapiens is a marvel. We . . . are a marvel.
If these facts are not sufficiently marvelous to shock the reader,
then let’s ponder why the facts aren’t marvelous. Everyone lives in
this dynamic teeming world, but to many these facts are not known.
The 22 percent who live in extreme poverty do not know them
because they do not live them.3 The day has yet to arrive when we
can say that no one lives in poverty. But even of those who do live
long lives peaceably and comfortably, not many know these facts
well, or have known them for long. It was just in 1990 when 47 per
cent of the world lived in extreme poverty.4 In absolute terms and
as a percentage of the world’s population, more and more people are
living longer, better lives.
Yet there is an uneasiness. However it may be that more and
more people are escaping poverty, not everyone is escaping its grav
ity at the same speed. Those who left earlier are accelerating in their
standard of living. Despite seeing nothing but exponential growth
behind us in world GDP per capita, we doubt the entire species is
being lifted out of poverty. We see nothing but decay in the relative
altitudes achieved, and we see others as weighted down or worse,
left behind. In the back of our minds there is fear, not wonder, about
this liftoff from poverty. What if our species has cheated biology
with stolen fuel? What if instead of being a marvel our species has
created a monster, something more than human and something we
cannot control.
Whether we are exceptional or have created a monstrous Adam
of our labors, consider the place our species occupies in nature. Like
F.A. Hayek, The Fatal Conceit 88 (Routledge 1998) (W.W. Bartley III, ed).
United Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report 2013 (June 2013),
online at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/MDG/english/mdg-report
-2013-english.pdf (visited Oct 12, 2015).
4
Id.
2
3
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all forms of life (animal, plant, fungus, protistan, and moneran)
our genes monitor our physical growth, metabolism, and behavior.5
Genes provide continuity, and genes provide for change. Homo sapiens is no exception. Like most or all animals, we learn how to act in
and react to our environment. Monarch butterflies east of the Rock
ies migrate north and south, except for the year-round residents of
Florida who stay put for the good weather. By a process of trial and
error, success reinforces and failure weakens patterns of action. Our
movements may be probabilistic and individually unpredictable, but
they are not completely random. If there is no moist matter to mudpuddle at a particular spot, a butterfly flutters away to find another,
contingent, of course, upon the prevailing wind and whether an ori
ole is diving. Patterns of action that are loose and indeterminate
make survival more likely. Predictably precise patterns make for
easy targets and are maladaptive to incremental changes in the envi
ronment.
Like some birds, many mammals, and most primates, we hand
down patterns of actions. Some of these actions include instilling
in infants patterns that are not acquired by the genes of a parent.
When conditioned patterns of actions are the results of training
from teachers who were likewise habituated to this pattern by their
earlier teachers, the individual has acquired a practice. While biolo
gists use the term tradition to describe this additional mechanism
for continuity and change, tradition, and to a lesser extent custom,
connotes a concomitance of belief with a habitual way of acting that
I wish to avoid at this point. Practices may reach their apogee in
Homo sapiens when these practices bond with thinking and know
ing to produce traditions, but we are not that different from brownheaded cowbirds, bottlenose dolphins, and white-faced capuchin
monkeys in that we all learn practices from our mentors.6
Like all mammals, our sociality starts with the nursing tie between
mother and young, which is consequently the source of mammalian
clustering.7 All members of a mammalian cluster categorize each
other. In the closest category no two individuals are treated exactly
the same. These intimates deal with each other as individuals. You
5
Except where noted, see Charles F. Hockett, Man’s Place in Nature (McGrawHill 1973), and references therein for details on the likenesses of Homo sapiens to
other species.
6
Dorothy M. Fragaszy and Susan Perry, eds, The Biology of Traditions: Models
and Evidence (Cambridge 2003).
7
Only 10–20 percent of all mammals cluster beyond mere mating and the motheroffspring nutritional link. See Peter J. Jarman and Hans Kruuk, eds, Phylogeny and
Social Organization in Mammals, in David B. Croft and Udo Ganslober, eds,
Comparison of Marsupial and Placental Behavior 80–101 (Finlander Verlag 1996).

This content downloaded from 206.211.139.192 on August 05, 2016 15:29:02 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

38

Humankind in Civilization’s Extended Order

might say they deal “personally” with each other, though conspecifi
cally would be nonanthropomorphically more accurate. The mother
may be the only member of a young mammal’s inner circle, and
this may change with age. In time litter mates may also be treated
as individuals, but one need not be closely related to know an indi
vidual as an individual. Whether a large or small set, the defining
characteristic of the closest members in a cluster is that they are
known to each other as individuals.
Beyond this inner circle, however, individuals are indistinct; they
are categorized into various groups and treated as all members of
the group are treated—the same. Category membership need not be
symmetrical. For example, on the pain of punishment all subordi
nates know the dominant adult male as an individual, but the domi
nant adult male may treat all subordinate males as merely members
of the group of subordinates. In mammalian sociality then, there are
the conspecifically known, whom we treat as individuals, and the
conspecifically unknown, with whom our relations are stereotyped,
that is, our patterns of actions and reactions are uniformly applied.
The conspecifically unknown may be allies, part of the fit and proper
background of the cluster, or they may be aliens, hostile and feared.
Like all mammals, we play. We play to learn, to prepare for eat
ing, sleeping, and fighting as adults. We also play to have fun. One
important difference between primates and other mammals is that
primates have extended lifespans and consequently an extended child
hood and adolescence. This means that primates play longer when
young. Primates also continue to play as adults. When we are young
at heart, as one says, we continue to learn and hence innovate in our
actions. Play makes our inherently conservative patterns of actions
more flexible while on the thin margin for survival.
Another defining characteristic of our order is that, as C.F. Hock
ett emphasizes, “[ p]rimates enjoy physical proximity and bodily
contact.”8 We primates take pleasure in regularly being in each oth
er’s company. It feels good to be in the proximity of those we know,
and when not in the presence of those we know, we desire to be. But
more than that, primates have a good time together. Our pleasure is
mutual, and our fun is mutual. The result of these differences with
other mammals is that, as an order, “primates who know each other
simply do more different things together.”9
Alien primates, on other hand, are an instant physical threat. One
either fights an alien when equally fit for combat or withdraws when
outnumbered or physically outmatched. Not surprisingly, primate
clusters do not intermingle (though bonobos and some species of
8
9

Hockett, Man’s Place in Nature at 68 (cited in note 5).
Id at 72.
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baboons are an occasional exception). Out of necessity small vulner
able groups may merge and large clusters may subdivide, but almost
never does an individual alien join a different cluster as a new fullfledged member. Membership of a primate cluster is largely for life.
Primate sociality is the most complex of the class. It balances our
inner circle treatment of individuals as individuals with the mutual
aid of the broader cluster against environmental threats. We are not
individually large and formidable enough to withstand predators on
our own and we don’t play the numbers game of producing oodles
of young so that just a few might survive. Primate sociality falls in
between stoic individuality and mass anonymity. By interconnect
ing the individually known to the individually unknown, primate
sociality is the foundation of community and has evolved for the
perpetuance of the community. An individual qua an individual mat
ters to those to whom we are known; that is the primate way. The
community also matters, but not the community qua the commu
nity. The community of mutual aid is simply the complement of
the set of aggressive aliens, a social formation that makes survival
possible. Primate sociality is the source of our connatural, that is,
unlearnt, feelings toward each other and hence, a big hence, the
source of our moral sentiments.
We have enough comparative biology. The history of our sociality
is deeper and more shared with the rest of the animal kingdom than
we might pridefully think. In it also we see our fear of the fearless
and therefore powerful alien. Combine this common history with
symbolic thought and civilization and we will have the makings of
restless, dissatisfied human beings. But I anticipate. The value of
placing humankind in evolutionary context is not to pigeonhole our
actions and to treat the patterns as constraints so given. Nor espe
cially is it to be a moral guide. Rather, it is to situate humankind’s
lot, to move with thoughtful haste through time, from the Miocene
through the Pleistocene to the Holocene now.
II. PROLOGUE ON THE PLEISTOCENE PLAIN
As humble and humbling as our genealogical relations may be, we
are the small god of the world. We stand alone with a spark of heav
en’s light: symbolic thought.10 All chordate communication systems,
except ours, are bound to the here and now.11 Only the human com
munication system can refer to a threat not physically present or a
10
See Terrence W. Deacon, The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of Language
and the Brain (Norton 1998).
11
See Derek Bickerton, Adam’s Tongue: How Humans Made Language, How Lan
guage Made Humans (Hill & Wang 2009).
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food source beyond the hill. And only the human communication
system exhibits symbolic relations among the signs.
Most primate calls can vary in frequency and loudness.12 The
more frequent or louder is the danger call the more intense the state
that elicited the sign. Hearers interpret this similarity between the
sign and the intensity of the caller’s state and respond accordingly.
This “iconic” reference between the sign and what it refers to is old
hat for primates. Other primate calls are “indexical,” that is, they
point in space and time to distinct threats right here, right now. A
vervet monkey has a different call to alert the rest of the troop to the
presence of either a leopard, an eagle, or a snake, each eliciting a dif
ferent response: run up for a leopard, run down for an eagle, and look
around for a snake.13 To be a primate as any primate is to interpret
iconic and indexical signs.
The spark that defeats all other animals is symbolic thought. What
was the selection pressure that ignited symbolic thinking in the genus
Homo? Every species must adapt to the facts of its environment to
survive. Two million years ago proto-humans began carving out a
new ecological niche as scavengers. Derek Bickerton argues that the
selection pressure to solve the recruitment problem could have been
strong enough to produce the first proto-words.14 Words as sym
bolic signs exchange information displaced from what we can see
before our very eyes. Conveying information about time (past, pres
ent, or future) and place (here, there, or anywhere) is a considerable
advantage for coordinating a group of scavengers, especially when
competing in a carnivorous world dominated by fangs and claws.
Besides humans only bees and ants have achieved such displace
ment in communication. The difference with their recruitment
is that waggle dances and pheromones are not symbolic. Our signs
are.
The fundamental difference between indexical and symbolic com
munication systems is that indices are only supported by the strength
of what is the case, whereas symbols are supported by both what is
and what is not the case. Consider first how an indexical sign works.
When a smoke detector goes off, the beep indicates the presence of
smoke. If the microwave made the same beep as the smoke detec
tor, then the strength of the smoke detector’s beep as an indicator of
12
See William O. Dingwall, The Evolution of Human Communication Systems,
in Haiganoosh Whitaker and Harry A. Whitaker, eds, 4 Studies in Neurolinguistics
(Academic 1979).
13
See Robert Seyfarth, Dorothy Cheney, and Peter Marler, eds, Monkey Responses
to Three Different Alarm Calls: Evidence of Predator Classifications and Semantic
Communication, 210 Sci 801 (1980).
14
Bickerton, Adam’s Tongue (cited in note 11).
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smoke is considerably weaker. An indexical sign is only as strong as
the direct association that supports it.
Consider how the words eat and drink work as symbols. Why
don’t we drink M&Ms or eat milk? Because a rule of the word eat
is that the object it takes must not be a liquid. As a symbol eat con
veys the meaning of chewing and swallowing, and, simultaneously,
it does not convey the meaning of simply swallowing once taken
into the mouth. Eat is supported by all of the symbols for edibles
that are solid, as well as all of the symbols for potables that cannot
be chewed before swallowing. Notice the openness of a symbolic
system to the unforeseeable. If you were to encounter a completely
foreign digestible called a rath, without any teaching you would
know in a conversation whether you would say you “drink it” or
“eat it” based upon whether it is a liquid or a solid.
Words then are linked to each other in an interlocking set of rela
tionships governed by rules. And with words come concepts. Words
that are free of time and place are free for, as Bickerton calls it,
offline thinking. He carefully explains:
I’m not saying that “concepts are words,” or “you have to have
a word to have a concept.” Least of all am I saying, “You can’t
think without words.” . . . The difference between online and
offline thinking is . . . that in online thinking, what’s being
thought about is right there in front of you, while in offline
thinking it isn’t. . . . [O]ffline thinking . . . by definition [is]
thinking about [what] can’t be there. Only the concepts can
be there. . . . Words are simply permanent anchors that most
concepts have—a means of pulling together all the sights and
sounds and smells, all the varied kinds of knowledge we have
about what the concept refers to. But once the brain found the
trick of making concepts, it no longer needed a word as the base
for a new concept. It just needed some place where all the knowl
edge could come together and link with other concepts.15
Now imagine what a primate with a disposition toward play
could do combinatorially with concepts not bound to the here and
now. It could create things that do not exist, like devils or unicorns
that poop rainbows. It could, as every human community does, pol
ish language for poetic and artistic purposes, and it could, as every
human community does, use language to construct a Weltanschau
ung.16 Playing with concepts is also serious business when survival
hinges on successfully adapting to facts. Disappointment and doubt
15
16

Id at 207–08.
Donald E. Brown, Human Universals (McGraw-Hill 1991).
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about the environment when combined with mammalian playful
curiosity yield a desire to search for the truth of reality, that is, it
yields science. In every language ever studied people can express the
concept/value true.17
Once the pilot light of a symbolic mind was lit, categorical dif
ferences in kind become possible in our patterns of doing and think
ing. Birds may build nests and beavers dams and lodges, but nei
ther’s construction projects require imagining what might be more
useful or productive in the future. They simply do what is neces
sary to construct the artifact: Move tree matter from there to here
and adhere with mud. In addition to producing artifacts, animals
also use primary tools. Chimpanzees prepare sticks for extracting a
snack from a termite hill and crush leaves into sponges for drink
ing water.18 But only humans make and use tools to make and use
derivative tools, and all humans do this.19 When no longer confined
to the here and now, a little creative tinkering can transform some
thing currently not useful or possible into something that might be
in the future. Integrate this tinkering disposition into a practice, and
know-how isn’t simply passed on from generation to generation; it
accumulates from generation to generation. And it accumulates in
the dispersed minds of the community. With each successive gen
eration human conspecifics become increasingly different, increas
ingly unequal.
If the symbolic mind supports two large discontinuities, language
and creativity, between humans and nonhumans,20 why stop with
just these two differences? When Matt Ridley observes that no other
species is as innovative as humans, he explains it as an extension of
a third large discontinuity: humans are the only animal to routinely
exchange one thing for another thing.21 For two people to exchange
for mutual benefit it is necessary for their minds to escape the here
and now.
Suppose Adam has apples and Oz oranges. To voluntarily exchange
their goods both must imagine a future state of the world in which
Adam has oranges and Oz apples. That is, both must imagine that
as Adam hands over the apples Oz hands over the oranges. Say that
Adam chooses to move first, handing the apples over to Oz. Adam
forgoes the apples in the here and now, holding in his mind several
17
  See Cliff Goddard and Anna Wierzbicka, Meaning and Universal Grammar:
Theory and Empirical Findings 2 (Benjamins 2002). The same is not true for false.
18
See Hockett, Man’s Place in Nature (cited in note 5).
19
Brown, Human Universal (cited in note 16); see also Anna Wierzbicka, Semantics:
Primes and Universals (Oxford 1996).
20
Bickerton, Adam’s Tongue (cited in note 11).
21
See Matt Ridley, The Rational Optimist: How Prosperity Evolves (Harper 2010).
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symbols of the present: (1) a future Oz (2) who hands over in the
future (3) some future oranges (4) to a future himself. A future Oz is
symbolic because it does not directly refer to the Oz standing before
Adam. Yes, a future Oz points to Oz, the person in the present. If it
didn’t there could be no symbol of a future Oz. But a symbol, like
a future Oz, conveys meaning m only in a context in which not(m)
could also occur but didn’t.22 Every human community employs the
logical notion of “not.”23
A future Oz conveys a meaning in the here and now because
Adam could have chosen not to hand over the apples and instead,
say, kill Oz and take his oranges. It is this tacit understanding of all
the explicitly discarded information that is not the case that gives
meaning to the symbol of a future Oz (and all the other symbols in
the exchange).
Killing Oz is not a far-fetched alternative, as evidenced by the
Greek for “to exchange,” katallattein, which at one time also meant
“to change from enemy into friend.”24 So when Adam has the oppor
tunity to not hand over apples in the here and now and he shows
that that is not true, his action of handing over the apples supports
the interlocking symbolic relationships of exchange. Given that
chimpanzees are firmly bound to the here and now,25 it’s no wonder
that they do not barter:26 they cannot entertain the counterfactuals
necessary to support giving up something of lesser value to attain
something of greater value. All human communities trade things.27
A fourth large discontinuity from other animals is that humans
are moral beings, and without symbolic thought we could not be
moral. At the core of morality is the abstract evaluation of what
is good. The concept good is atomic; that is, no other atomic con
cepts (also called “semantic primes”) can define it and its indefin
able except of itself.28 Some human communities contrast the term
“good” with a term “not good” and others with a term for “bad.”
But no human community expresses the contrasting terms as “bad”
and “not bad” with no term for “good.”29 Only with “good” and
“bad” can “not bad” express an intermediate case. A word for good

Deacon, The Symbolic Species at 79–92 (cited in note 10).
Brown, Human Universal (cited in note 16).
24
See Friedrich A. Hayek, 2 Law, Legislation, and Liberty 108 (Chicago 1976).
25
Deacon, The Symbolic Species (cited in note 10).
26
See Sara F. Brosnan et al, Chimpanzee Autarky, 3 Plos One 1, (2008), online at
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0001518.
27
Brown, Human Universals (cited in note 16).
28
Wierzbicka, Semantics (cited in note 19).
29
Brown, Human Universals (cited in note 16).
22
23
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is universal and universally unmarked.30 Without any need for a def
inition, good means good to every person in every language what
ever the word for it is.
Doing good consists not in the good things we get to satisfy our
most basic animalistic impulses to ingest, excrete, and avoid pain,
heat, and cold. Doing good consists in the good direction of our
motives which good things satisfy.31 To ascribe a motive as good,
someone else’s or one’s own, requires the abstract concepts you and I.
Dolphins, elephants, and nonhuman apes can recognize themselves
in mirrors,32 which is a necessary condition for an “I” to understand
“your” motives, but none can evaluate motives of others with the
abstract concept of good because good stands outside the here and
now.33 All human languages contain pronouns,34 and more specifi
cally, pronouns for the abstract concepts you and I.35 Both you and
I stand outside the present, the pronouns for which are symbols
of someone who both has acted in the past and will act in the
future.
Unlike a chimpanzee that can identify a self, for us symbolic
thinkers there is not simply a self in the mirror because there is no
self without other selves. There is an “I” in the mirror that we get to
know by experience of the “We.”36 “I” is not a trivial concept. It is
the only concept which only I may use to refer to myself. No other
30
Goddard and Wierzbicka, Meaning and Universal Grammar (cited in note 17),
argue that bad is also a universally distinct concept even though it is more readily
expressed in some languages as not good: Goddard and Wierzbicka, Meaning and
Universal Grammar at 496–97 (cited at 17). If the word for bad in another language,
like Acehnese, connotes something stronger than bad does in English, then the
contextual use of the word for bad in Acehnese may less readily call for not good
as opposed to bad.
31
“ ‘Tis evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only the motives that
produc’d them, and consider the actions as signs or indications of certain principles in
the mind and temper. The external performance has no merit. We must look within
to find the moral quality.” David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 307 ([1740]
Oxford 2000) (David F. Norton and Mary J. Norton, eds).
32
See Frans B.M. de Waal, Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved
(Princeton 2006).
33
See Christopher Boehm, Moral Origins: The Evolution of Virtue, Altruism, and
Shame (Basics 2012).
34
Brown, Human Universals (cited in note 16).
35
Wierzbicka, Semantics (cited in note 19).
36
Compare with Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments 113 ([1759] Liberty
Fund 1982): “Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in
some solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no
more think of his own character. . . . Bring him into society, and he is immediately
provided with the mirror which he wanted before.” Once there is a “We,” each “I”
can imagine Adam Smith’s impartial spectator.
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person uses the concept I to refer to me. The problem which moral
ity solves is how all the individual I’s in a community of “We” can
fittingly satisfy their basic impulses while maintaining the primate
pleasure of being in each other’s company.37 We not only demand
that others do good. We also care that we ourselves supply good con
duct. Both the demand and supply of good conduct are a function of
conceptualized motives. The outward action is the symbolic sign.
When this talking, trading, innovating, motive-ascribing little god
of a hominid appears 150,000 to 50,000 years ago on the Pleistocene
plain, it is living in bands with unique features. First, humans com
pete in groups more “extensively, fluidly, and complexly” than any
other sexual organism.38 Unlike the mainly inbreeding bands of non
human primates, early human bands were exogamous.39 And with
the exchange of women spread dispersed technical innovations in
controlling fire and its applications to roasting and boiling food.40
Now why would a symbolic species go about exchanging women?
Because, secondly, Homo sapiens is the only species to compete on
a large scale group against group.41 Unlike any other species, other
humans were the primary reason why early humans did not survive
or reproduce.42 Humans are one of three species that deliberately
and frequently kill conspecifics over territory. 43 The other two are
chimpanzees and wolves, which are also groupish and highly social.
But only in humans did kinship ties from exogamy ever so slightly
decrease the frequency of intergroup violence. Early Homo sapiens,
though, was not done converting enemies into friends. Their enemiesturned-friends were conspecifically, no, personally, known to each
other, being just down the road. Modern Homo sapiens takes exchange
much further, converting the personally unknown from enemies into
honorary friends. But I divulge too soon.
To protect themselves against external threats other gregarious
species flock, herd, or school to form large groups of anonymous
masses. When the principal threat is within the same species, the
37
Id at 116: “Nature, when she formed man for society, endowed him with an
original desire to please, and an original aversion to offend his brethren. She taught
him to feel pleasure in their favourable, and pain in their unfavourable regard. She
rendered their approbation most flattering and most agreeable to him for its own
sake; and their disapprobation most mortifying and most offensive.”
38
See Richard D. Alexander, The Biology of Moral Systems 80 (Aldine 1987).
39
Hockett, Man’s Place in Nature (cited in note 5).
40
See Chester S. Chard, Man in Prehistory (McGraw-Hill 1969), in Hockett, Man’s
Place in Nature (cited in note 5).
41
See Alexander, The Biology of Moral Systems (cited in note 38).
42
Id at 80.
43
See Richard Wrangham, Killer Species, 133 Daedalus 25 (2004).

This content downloaded from 206.211.139.192 on August 05, 2016 15:29:02 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

46

Humankind in Civilization’s Extended Order

between-group aggression formatively begets the unlearnt feelings
for living within the group. Larger groups create more potential con
flicts of interest, that is, greater costs of living within the group.
Thus, to minimize these costs the unlearnt feelings selected for liv
ing within the group were constitutive of common purposes and
common ends. If there was no between-group aggression, instincts
of solidarity would not have been necessary. The unlearnt feelings
that support between-group aggression can be glossed as enmity, ill
will, and hate for those outside the “We” and amity, goodwill, and
love for the members of the “We.”
Mutualism governs the relations of an “I” in the “We.”44 People
participate in a war party with other people in the group because
they think that people want to be successful in the raid, that each
“I” wants the same thing. The people in the group also think that
success in the raid will be good for everyone in the group, and each
“I” thinks that it will be good for “me” too. The war party, however,
will not be successful if some people don’t do their part. Because of
this, each “I” wants to do his part in the war party. Each “I” does his
part not because he is restrained by the “We” to do so, but because
he socializes his own conduct to be able to live in the “We.”45
The most distinctive feature of the “We” in early human groups
is their egalitarianism.46 The social structures of our most closely
related primates are hierarchical. Christopher Boehm hypoth
esizes that the selection pressure from large-game hunting trans
formed what must have been hierarchical groups of hominids in the
Miocene into egalitarian groups in the Pleistocene. This evolution
requires dispositions to control upstart dominants, incorrigible devi
ants, and sneaky free-riders. As an example of the problems egalitar
ian groups face, Boehm recounts Colin Turnbull’s story of Cephu, a
Mbuti Pygmy from the Congo region of Africa. On the day of the
recounted incident Cephu’s band went hunting for forest antelope.
Unlike large-game hunting, which men carry out with projectile
weapons, this hunting expedition was for small game and involved
the entire group. The men would set up large nets in a semicircle
44
See Anna Wierzbicka, Imprisoned in English: The Hazards of English as a Default
Language 111 (Oxford 2014); see also Michael Tomasello, Why We Cooperate (MIT
2009).
45
Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments at 182 (cited in note 36): “When he views
himself in the light in which he is conscious that others will view him, he sees that
to them he is but one of the multitude in no respect better than any other in it. If
he would act so as that the impartial spectator may enter into the principles of his
conduct, which is what of all things he has the greatest desire to do, he must, upon
this, as upon all other occasions, humble the arrogance of his self-love, and bring it
down to something which other men can go along with.”
46
Boehm, Moral Origins (cited in note 33).
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and the women and children would noisily drive the prey toward
the traps. Each man would spear the prey in his net and feed his
family with it.
If every man set up his net in the large semicircle, no redistribu
tion would be required. Every net would catch something. Cephu,
however, decided that he would improve his chances by moving
his net ahead of everyone else’s. He didn’t think anyone saw him
in the dense forest. Cephu was wrong. Upon returning to the main
camp, the other men relentlessly hurled insults at him. He was even
denied a chair by a mere youth. Cephu tried to cover up his devi
ousness with the lie that he had lost the group in the forest, but
the band would hear nothing of it. They knew what had happened
and he knew that they knew what had happened. Cephu eventually
broke down with an apology and an offer to hand over the meat. The
band seized it all, including a liver that his wife had hidden in antici
pation of just such an eventuality. With that reparation, Cephu was
again an accepted member of the band.
Apart from his close family, the band was united against Cephu.
The group shared rules of conduct and had agreed on the facts, the
significance of which Boehm explains: “[t]his singularity of pur
pose is important because if a consensus is not built before action
is taken, what might otherwise have been an instance of efficient
group sanctioning can turn into sheer factional conflict, with both
sides claiming moral rectitude,” and so on and so on as in the Hat
fields and the McCoys.47 Like Boehm, Alexander emphasizes that
groups maintain cohesion with rules that serve as “restraints on
particular methods of seeking self-interests, specifically on activi
ties that affect deleteriously the efforts of others to seek their own
interests.”48 Such are the demands of morality upon our conduct.
But why did everyone else in Cephu’s band not defect? Was it solely
out of a fear for being treated like Cephu, or have humans, as Dennis
Krebs posits, “acquired the disposition to obey rules when no one
is watching”?49 The band apart from Cephu supplied good conduct
because each “I” of the group thought it would be good for the group
and good for each “me.” Each “I” in the group, as Lionel Tiger and
Robin Fox explain, “is not so much closely connected with the prod
uct of his own labor as he is with the product of the joint labors of
his group, in a direct and satisfying way.”50
Id at 244.
Richard D. Alexander, The Biology of Moral Systems 80, 81 (Aldine 1987).
49
Krebs appears unaware that he is channeling Adam Smith via his Darwininspired project. See Dennis L. Krebs, The Origins of Morality 84 (Oxford 2011).
50
See Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox, The Imperial Animal 132 (Holt, Rinehart &
Winston 1971).
47
48
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Cephu was not the first nor was he the last of his band to seek
more and better. But no member of any other species could act as
he did with the purpose of achieving more in the future. Along with
good and bad, not and true, and you and I, want and more are also
universal human concepts that stand outside the here and now.51 To
want more and to want better is to be human. “A million years
of natural selection,” says Ridley, “shaped human nature . . . not
to settle for contentment: people are programmed to desire, not to
appreciate.”52 That is not to say that after all that time we want
more and better with clarity. We may, like Cephu, confusedly seek
to satisfy the restlessness in our breast. Humankind errs as long we
strive. Good people in their dark impulses, though, are well aware
of the proper course.
We now turn to business.
I I I . T H E F I R S T PA RT O F T H E T R A G E D Y
On the eve of civilization human bands lived in egalitarian Gar
dens of Eden. The boundaries between these Edens were, lest we
with rose-tinted nostalgia forget, bloody and deadly.53 But inside
each Eden what universal sentiment ennobled humankind with the
ideal of equality? The usual story, as I have already stated, rests on
the selection pressure to make group hunting of large game effica
cious. The usual presentation of the story, as Boehm exemplifies,
begins by contrasting actions that support and hinder the pursuit
of large game. There are those actions that must be good, such as
“sharing” the product of the hunt “equally,” and those that must
be bad, such as “bullying,” “cheating,” and “thieving” others out
of “their shares.”54 It is easy to read our own modern valuations
into the problem, as I did above when I summarized the problem as
“control[ling] upstart dominants, incorrigible deviants, and sneaky
free-riders.” Attaching the value judgment of bad to actions that are
“punished” for not supporting efficacious large game hunting, how
ever, is insufficient to begin answering our question on the origins
of our egalitarianism, for it fallaciously assumes as a conclusion that
which we wish to explain. The problem is often posed as what are
the evolutionary origins of the mental structure called a conscience,
“a mechanism that induces people to pass judgment on themselves
Wierzbicka, Semantics 76–78 (cited in note 19).
Ridley, The Rational Optimist at 27 (cited in note 21).
53
See Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined
(Penguin 2012).
54
Boehm, Moral Origins at 152 (cited in note 33).
51
52
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and their behaviors.”55 But as Adam Smith astutely recognized,
“[t]he word conscience does not immediately denote any moral faculty
by which we approve or disapprove. Conscience supposes, indeed, the
existence of some such faculty, and properly signifies our conscious
ness of having acted agreeably or contrary to its directions.”56 The
question of how we think and feel about the equality and inequality
of ends remains. We need an amoral sentiment to jumpstart a moral
izing tradition.
Suppose Cephu finds success on a large game hunt but his fellow
hunters are not so fortunate. To assume that Cephu has evolved
a conscience that approves of sharing the hunt equally and disap
proves of bullying others out of their shares raises the question why
Cephu cares about a sharing norm and equality. It also begs the
question of why the rest of the band cares about equality. So let’s
first consider what the unsuccessful families think and feel.57 Upon
Cephu’s return to camp, the other hunters and their families think
to themselves that something good has happened to Cephu and that
it didn’t happen to them. Moreover, it is bad for them that their
hunter returned without anything, for they have no food. They want
good things like a successful hunt to happen to them. When they
think about Cephu’s success and their hunter’s lack thereof, they are
reminded that they are without food and they feel bad.
What will hungry people who feel bad do if they remain hungry?
They will take the food from Cephu. If Cephu fears that his band
will take food from him and potentially leave him and his family
without any, what will Cephu do? He will give portions to the other
families to make them feel better. A tiny, ε > 0 portion will not suf
fice because the families will still feel bad. How far will Cephu go in
doling out portions? From his prior experience Cephu knows that,
despite his finely honed hunting skills, sometimes the prey won’t
cross his path. Cephu knows that sometime in the future he will be
in the same position as the other families, thinking and feeling like
they think and feel now. Knowing how large game hunting works
and empathizing with the other families, Cephu gives each family
the same portion he gives his own.
If Cephu and his band pass this pattern of action down to their
sons, and their sons to their sons, and so on and so on, then the band
55
Krebs, The Origins of Morality at 207 (cited in note 49). See also Boehm, Moral
Origins at 152 (cited in note 33).
56
Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments at 326 (cited in note 36).
57
In addition to want, Wierzbicka, Semantics (cited in note 19), identifies three
other atomistic mental predicates that are universally found in human languages:
think, feel, and know.
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follows the practice of sharing the hunt. Because this practice of
sharing has survival value, the practice gradually gives rise to what
we call memory and foresight, that is, a belief outside the here and
now that pursuing the end of sharing is good.58 Integrate this belief
into the verbal play of communicating this value to each other and
we have more than the practice of a dolphin or a monkey; we have
tradition.
Our question remains unanswered: What is the universal sen
timent that ennobled humankind with the ideal of equality? It is
the same sentiment that L.P. Hartley’s dystopia obsessively fears
in Facial Justice and the same sentiment that depraves Melville’s
Claggart, wracks Shelley’s monster, spurs Shakespeare’s Iago, and
consumes Milton’s Satan. That sentiment is envy.
Envy is a universal human sentiment, and every human commu
nity symbolically copes with the fear of envy.59 But how can the
principle of—in your most mellifluous French—égalité be founded
upon so odious a sentiment as envie? Surely, we exclaim with a
tinge of indignation, the Good “E” cannot be founded upon the
Bad “E.” We are more willing, perhaps, to admit that our desire
for equality is founded upon empathizing with the gratefulness of
those who benefit from reducing inequality. Gratefulness and envy,
however, are counterparts to one another: If our desire for equality
arises from empathizing with the gratefulness of the less equal who
would become more equal with sharing, our fear of and antipathy
for inequality can hardly fail to proceed from empathizing with the
envy of the less equal.
Envy is connatural. No one has to teach us how to envy another
person. We simply think and feel the desire to acquire something
possessed by another person. We do, however, have to be taught, via
tradition, how to keep a check on our envy.
Envy is ubiquitous. The anthropologist George Foster collects
examples from around the globe and across history of three of the
most common envy-causing items: food, children, and health.60 Not
surprisingly, all three comprise the core of a family’s survival. Cus
toms around each item have sprung up as controls on the fear of the
envy. For example, to avoid piercing eyes of envy, the Spanish in
the village of Yegen would sit in the corner and eat with their backs
58
This is what Hayek means when he says that reason “logically, psychologically,
and temporally” follows from tradition, that is, “[m]an is not born wise, rational, and
good, but has to be taught to become so.” Hayek, The Fatal Conceit at 21, 23 (cited
in note 2).
59
See George F. Foster, The Anatomy of Envy: A Study in Symbolic Behavior, 13
Current Anthropology 165 (1972).
60
Foster, The Anatomy of Envy 13 Current Anthropology 165.
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to the room.61 From Egypt to India and Taiwan families would give
children denigrating names, like Small Snake or Pot, so as to sym
bolically deny there is a reason to envy them.62
The etymology of envy provides a clue that points to further evi
dence of the pervasiveness of envy in human history. Envy comes
from the Latin invidia, which itself is the nominalization of invidere: to look askance or maliciously upon, or to cast an evil eye
upon.63 The evil eye is the eye of the envious person. “From time
immemorial,” expounds the sociologist Helmut Schoeck, “suspi
cion of witchcraft or black magic has fallen upon those who have
had cause to be envious—of someone less ugly than themselves,
of lucky parents, or the peasant with a good harvest and healthy
cattle, etc. . . . It is a constant aspect of primitive existence. Some
tribes, such as the Navaho of North America, the African Azande
and the West Pacific islanders, the Dobuans, seem to have a par
ticularly strong belief in witchcraft, but basically the picture is the
same wherever the investigation is made.”64 Envy is at the very
heart of such charming children’s stories as Cinderella. Supernatu
ral witches are always ugly in modern fairy tales so that they have
a believable motivation to harm the innocent protagonist. Schoeck
also provides example after example of the connection between
black magic and those whose circumstances are envied: “A bright
child who matures early is regarded by the Lovedu as a future witch.
Life is spent in perpetual fear of envy.”65 It is perhaps more useful for
understanding Pleistocene morality to describe early bands of Homo
sapiens, not as noble sounding egalitarians, but rather as invidiosi,
envious people.
Envy is taboo. Try attributing it to someone in everyday conversa
tion and see how well that goes over. Or try finding envy as a human
motive in social science research or literary criticism. It’s there, but
not easily found. For decades worth of volumes in the mid-twentieth
century Schoeck finds not one single instance of the word in the
subject index of major anthropology and sociology journals. Not one.
He also identifies a “blind spot” toward the envy-motive in sev
eral scholarly discussions of Melville’s Billy Budd, Sailor,66 this
despite chapter twelve’s title, “Pale ire, envy and despair” (Milton’s
Id at 180.
Id at 176–77.
63
See the entry for invideo, online at http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/invideo#Latin
(last visited Oct 15, 2015).
64
See Helmut Schoeck, Envy: A Theory of Social Behaviour 40 (Liberty Fund repr
1987).
65
Id at 50.
66
Id at 168–71.
61
62
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description of Satan sans the comma after “pale”).67 The unwilling
ness to acknowledge envy at work in human intercourse continues
to this day. The Wikipedia page for Melville’s novella is devoid of
any words beginning with “env.”68 As Foster says, “[i]t is probably
because of the enormous hold that envy has on us, and a measure of
the inner depths to which it stirs us, that we are reluctant to admit
to envy, and to discuss it openly . . . ”69
Envy is destructive. Left unchecked it can quickly lead to hate
and hate to violence, tearing asunder the ties that bind a group. Any
band that does not control envy will not remain a band for very long.
Envy also feeds our tigerish thirst to exterminate our enemies. It is
not accidental that Milton, after living through a decade of three
English civil wars, endows evil incarnate with envy.
Yet envy is a sentiment so unavoidable and so deeply implanted
in the human condition that it would be unwise for any scientific
inquiry into the sentiment to postulate that its ends are exclusively
negative. Nor does it necessarily entail a moral judgment to call
early Homo sapiens (and hence ourselves) invidiosi. As Nietzsche
reads the Greeks of antiquity, envy also “spurs men to activity: not
to the activity of fights of annihilation but to the activity of fights
which are contests.”70 Humankind’s activity can easily abate; we
prefer unconditional rest. Envy roils us from inactivity and passive
acceptance of our current lot to contest, to achieve, to be a better
hunter, sewer, storyteller, toolmaker, healer, or cook. The activity
of a contest frees the mind from the grasp of invidious compari
sons. With an “I’ll-show-them” attitude, channeled toward positive
achievement rather than destruction, the desire to overcome envy
creates good.71 Envy, as Mephistopheles says of himself, is “Part
of that force which would / Do evil evermore, and yet creates the
good.”72
The black mist has now crept low into the garden. Adams and
Eves divide their labor as they have been doing for quite some time.73
Allies through exogamy also engage in reciprocal gift giving trade.
67
Melville’s Billy Budd, Sailor (Simon & Schuster 2006). The novella was published
posthumously based upon notes. Because later versions drop the title for chapter 12,
see an early version of the book entitled, Billy Budd, Foretopman.
68
Billy Budd, online at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billy_Budd (visited on Oct 15,
2015).
69
Foster, The Anatomy of Envy 13 Current Anthropology 165.
70
  See Friedrich Nietzsche, From Homer’s Contest, in The Portable Nietzsche 35
([1872] Viking Penguin 1954) (Walter Kaufmann, ed, trans).
71
Schoeck, Envy at 415–17 (cited in note 64).
72
See Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust 159 (Anchor Books 1963) (Walter
Kaufmann, trans).
73
Ridley, The Rational Optimist (cited in note 21).
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Examples that have survived in present stateless societies include
the ceremonial potlatch, kula, moka, and abutu.74 The symbols in
gift exchange, such as the kula bracelets in the Trobriands, convey
the meaning of goodwill and peace between groups, as well simul
taneously not conveying the meaning of ill will and war. Indeed,
failure to repay the gift exchange is “an act of hostility, a declaration
that killing may now commence between the two groups.”75 The
consequent peace between gardens supports exchange in ordinary
goods and the use of natural resources, such a fishing in a host’s
waters or quarrying for stone in the host’s territory.76
All exchanges of ordinary goods are between personally known
individuals, eyeball-to-eyeball. What everyone knows regarding the
trade is what everyone sees, and what everyone sees is readily intelli
gible. Adam knows that the fish he cannot obtain locally is found in
Oz’s Eden. Oz also knows that the salt he wants is found in Adam’s
Eden. More than that, each knows that they each mixed their own
labor with the items to be exchanged. From beginning to end Adam
and Oz easily comprehend the production and distribution process.
It’s possible that Oz could personally secure salt for himself. It may
be even closer than where Adam gets his, but certainly not closer
than right here, right now. The exchange saves Oz precious time,
and saved time in good times means marginal comfort and saved
time in bad times means survival. When Adam and Oz exchange,
each “I” thinks that it would be good for “me” and for the other “I,”
and so, unlike with war parties and large game hunting, each “I” is
becoming more closely connected with the product of his own labor
than he is with the product of their joint labor, because there is no
joint labor. There is interband trade in which all ends pursued are
known to be good, in a direct and satisfying way.
The serpent continues his temptation for a better life. By 12,000–
9600 BC people in the Levant are living in widespread permanent
settlements exchanging for obsidian from central Turkey and black
basalt and seashells from the Mediterranean.77 Moving rapidly toward
a fully domesticated mode of subsistence, people by 9600–6900 BC
are widely cultivating and harvesting cereals and raising goats,
sheep, pigs, and cattle.78 The cauldron of civilization, the Mesopo
tamian alluvium circa 6,500–3,800 BC, appears at first thought to
74
See George Dalton, Aboriginal Economies in Stateless Societies, in Timothy K.
Earle and Jonathon E. Ericson, eds, Exchange Systems in Prehistory 191 (Academic
1977).
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
See Barry Cunliffe, Europe between the Oceans: 9000 BC–AD 1000, 91 (Yale
2008).
78
Id at 91.
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contain few resources and only one ingredient, grain. But a closer
look in the pot reveals three other zones of specialized subsistence,
all linked by exchange networks.79 Semiarid pasturelands support
full-time herdsman. Orchards and gardens near permanent rivers
and streams provide summer harvests. Swamps and watercourses
supply fish, a major source of protein, and reeds, a local building
material.
Suppose, for example, that a Cephu lives in protoliterate south
ern Mesopotamia, sometime in the fourth millennium BC. His per
sonal circumstances are particularly unfavorable, meaning he is an
orphan, illegitimate son, halfbreed, or some other general outcast.80
Part of the fit and proper background, Cephu lives on the far edge
of the settlement, known locally as Daisy, for its rolling hills of
flowers where the sheep graze. Compared to the rest of residents of
Daisy, Cephu is destitute, owning virtually nothing.81 Compared to
78 percent of us moderns, the residents of Daisy are destitute, liv
ing on the modern equivalent of $1.25 a day, on a very good day. In
Daisy there are the “have-nots” and the “care-nots.”82
Most of the residents of Daisy think, feel, and act, in harmony
with the age old customs attached to the different subcommunities
of herders, cereal cultivators, fishermen, and textile makers. Special
ized know-how is passed down from parents to children, generation
after generation. Insights from a little tinkering here and there accu
mulate in the dispersed minds of Daisy. Herders teach their children
how to care for ewes having a difficult birth. Cultivators teach their
children how to identify nonshattering spikes, an indicator of an
easier harvest, in barley grasses. Eventually the wild barley is geneti
cally modified, domesticated barley and only the recessive condi
tion of nonshattering spikes is expressed. Children learn from their
parents the customary rates for exchanging wool for reeds, dates for
grain, fish for stone, and so forth. When under attack from roving
bandits, the residents of Daisy defend each other against aggressors.
The care-nots do not question the good and true values represented
by the community. It is their simple acceptance of them which
give Daisy’s existence its uncomplicated naturalness. This is what

79
See Robert McC Adams, The Evolution of Urban Society: Early Mesopotamia
and Prehistoric Mexico 48 (Aldine 1966).
80
Schoeck, Envy at 402 (cited in note 64).
81
Cephu may own nothing, but all human groups have property in “tools, uten
sils, ornaments, and so forth.” Ralph Linton, Universal Ethical Principles: An Anthro
pological View, in Ruth Nanda Anshen, ed, Moral Principles of Action: Man’s Ethical
Imperative 655 (Harper 1952).
82
See Homer G. Barnett, Innovations: The Basis of Cultural Change 400 (McGrawHill 1953).
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“We” do and how “We” do it. Experience supplies what understand
ing cannot.
Cephu is a have-not invidioso. Every custom in Daisy chafes
him. Not resigned to his fate, he seeks more and better than the
grim existence of sub-subsistence. With nothing but a willingness to
work long hours and a propensity to save, generic attributes of mid
dleman minorities,83 Cephu peddles together some woolen textiles,
dates, and dried fish and sets out for the far great North—Anatolia,
Iran, or Syria—which he and everyone else in Daisy has only heard
about in stories. In doing so, a have-not invidioso, thinking outside
the here and now, breaks free from the Miocenian-old fear of aliens.
With less to lose than a care-not, Cephu can attempt a risky change.
Against the odds of being killed on the way, and not being killed
upon arrival, he offers an Anatolian named Yahya (similarly on the
fringe of his community) what little he has left in his cheap pack.
In exchange Cephu receives tiny samples of dear things heard of
but never before seen in Daisy: cedar and cypress oils (a bactericide,
pesticide, and base for paints), common metals like bitumen and
copper, and exotic metals like gold, silver, and lead.84
And so a southern Mesopotamian and an Anatolian initiate a very
slow and gradual process of connecting two very different communi
ties through trade, very slow and gradual because the mutual aliens
must find novel ground rules for forming their new linking cluster.
The novelty lies not in the manifest fact that human conspecifics
have never shared common rules of conduct with regard to each
other. Every human cluster maintains cohesion in the face of groupagainst-group competition with traditions that prescribe good ends
and proscribe bad ends. The key proviso is that the “ethical systems
function only in terms of in-groups,” that is, they only apply to each
“I” in the personally known “We.”85 Aliens outside the “We” are not
treated like the “We” are treated; they are simply another element
of the natural world, like in this anecdote recounted by anthropolo
gist Ralph Linton:
[T]he Maori of New Zealand, one of the most ingenious and
philosophical of Stone Age peoples, showed all the virtues ad
mired by Europeans in dealings with fellow tribesmen. Their
attitude toward outsiders can be judged by the following: “A
Maori relating an account of an expedition said incidentally,
‘On the way I was speaking to a red-haired girl who had just
83
See Thomas Sowell, Black Rednecks and White Liberals 65–110 (Encounter
Books 2005).
84
See Guillermo Algaze, The Uruk World System: The Dynamics of Expansion of
Early Mesopotamian Civilization (Chicago 2005).
85
Linton, Universal Ethical Principles at 649 (cited in note 81).
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been caught out in the open. . . . My companions remained
with the girl while I went on . . . . As we came back, I saw the
head of the red-haired girl lying in the fern by the side of the
track, and further on, we overtook one of the Waihou carrying
a back load of flesh, which he was taking to our camp to be
cooked for food; the arms of the girl were round his neck whilst
the body was on his back.’ ”86
In contrast, the novelty is that through trade each alien conspe
cific becomes an honorary member of each other’s “We,” an entirely
new category in the history of primate sociality—an enemy-alien
becomes a friend. The category is new because honorary members
are not full-fledged members of the original cluster; they remain
aliens from another cluster, not personally known, not personally
loved or cherished. In the museum of our mind there are no exhibits
on the concrete ends of people we do not personally know. Mutually
unknown circumstances and histories make it difficult to pursue
good common ends.87 What is much less difficult and what honor
ary members are afforded is that “I” do not do bad things to (an
honorary) “you.” Each “I” evaluates “my” and “your” conduct in a
common framework of general abstract rules that “largely consist
of prohibitions (“shalt not’s”) that designate adjustable domains for
individual decisions.”88
Notice the subtle shift. With members of the full-fledged “We,”
I refrain from doing things that will end up bad for you and you
and you because I know what is individually bad for each differ
ent you. I personally know you and treat you as an individual. Each
person can be treated differently because I know each one of you as
an individual. Making a joke about someone’s appearance works for
some but not others because I know who can take it and who can’t.
Hence, “Do not joke about someone’s appearance” is not a general,
nor abstract rule. It is a person-by-person rule for people that I know.
In contrast, because I do not personally know an honorary “you” as
an individual, the proscriptions are more abstract: for example, do
not steal, do not deceive, and do not breach a promise.89 The rules
are abstract in that any honorary member X can be inserted in the
rule “Do not steal from X.”90 Every honorary member of the “We”
is treated the same.

Id at 649–50.
Hayek, The Fatal Conceit (cited in note 2).
88
Id at 12.
89
Id.
90
Of course, all general abstract rules also apply to full-fledged members of the
“We,” but they apply personally by virtue of the membership in the “We.”
86
87
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The story now must change to tragedy and alienation, distance
and distaste, anger and rebuke, foul distrust and disloyal breach. Sup
pose Cephu finds success on subsequent trips to and from Anatolia.
He serves as the middleman exchanging Daisy’s grain and woolen
textiles with Yahya for cedar oil, bitumen, copper, and lead. What do
Daisians think and feel about this business? Upon Cephu’s return,
the residents of Daisy think to themselves that something good has
happened to Cephu and that it didn’t happen to them. Moreover, it
is bad for some of them; Anatolian metals are high quality substi
tutes for local building materials. The customary rates of exchange
for stones are no longer customary; they are becoming more and
more unfavorable each day. The stone quarriers are working the
same or even more hours and receiving less grain, dates, and fish for
each finished tool.91 For many things, stones are becoming obsolete.
The quarriers want good things like Cephu’s prosperity to happen to
them.92 When they think about Cephu’s success and their deteriorat
ing standard of living, they feel bad.
Unlike with interband trade, this process is unintelligible to Dai
sians. When a Daisian exchanges with Cephu, each “I” is becoming
even more closely connected with the product of his own labor. But,
more important, each “I” is now disconnected from both the Anato
lian labor that created the new product and the middleman’s service
that brought the product to their settlement. The production and
distribution process transcends individual perception. Daisians can
not see and therefore do not know that their exchanges with Cephu
are good for Anatolians. They cannot see the new rules of conduct
that have changed enemy aliens into honorary friends. The ends
pursued are unknown, in an indirect and rather unsatisfying way.
Some Daisians go further. They hurl insults at Cephu. They liken
him in stories to a monster. They claim evil became his good. They
say his success “stinks of sorcery.”93 He made nothing. He built
nothing. He grew nothing. He herded nothing. And yet he created
consumable riches out of woolen rags by buying cheap and selling
dear. Cephu’s success, indeed, doubly stinks of sorcery.
Pishery-pashery, maybe. Surely mistaken on all sorts of facts. But
my point is how easy it is to envisage a role for envy at the birth
of civilization that is both positive and negative, productive and
destructive, value-affirming and value-denying, value-appreciating
91
Hence, as Hayek says, “[c]onstraints on the practices of the small group, it
must be emphasized and repeated, are hated.” Hayek, The Fatal Conceit 13 (cited in
note 2).
92
The rates of return from long-distance trade would be unfathomable, multiple
hundreds of percent, or it might all be lost to roving bandits.
93
Hayek, The Fatal Conceit at 91 (cited in note 2).
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and value-depreciating. The paragraph above on Cephu’s success,
like the corresponding one on Cephu’s successful large game hunt,
is built from Wierzbicka’s definitional decomposition of envy. 94
Envy itself is an amoral sentiment. How we act on envy and the fear
of envy is a matter of morality.
As a precursor of the modern firm, Daisy, like all communities,
was “a temporary aggregation of people to help them do their pro
ducing in such a way to help others do their consuming.”95 The
trade links, made possible by new rules of conduct between honor
ary friends, combined with the zones of specialization to set off a
chain reaction in the crucible of southern Mesopotamia. Seeking
more and better people begin emptying the hillsides to form the first
urban areas of Uruk.96 The stage is now set for the first extended
order of civilization: “[T]he greater density of population, leading
to the discovery of opportunities for specialization . . . led to yet
further increases of population and per capita income that made pos
sible another increase in the population. And so on.”97 The amity,
goodwill, and love of the residents of Daisy for each other could not
rescue the settlement from the winds of accumulated change. Daisy
died, but the residents were saved.
So begin the marvels of Homo sapiens. World GDP per capita,
however, would remain stagnant for another few millennia.98 Very
slow and gradual indeed, Adam Smith. What remains to be told is
the tragedy of the second part, the wonder of the last 200 years.

94
See Anna Wierzbicka, Emotions across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and
Universals 98 (Cambridge 1999).
Envy (X felt envy)
(a) X felt something because X thought something
(b) sometimes a person thinks about someone else:
(c) “something good happened to this other person
(d) it didn’t happen to me
(e) this is bad
(f) I want good things like this to happen to me”
(g) when this person thinks this, this person feels something bad
(h) X felt something like this
(i) because X thought something like this
Anna Wierzbicka, Emotions across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Univer
sals 98 (Cambridge 1999).
95
Ridley, The Rational Optimist at 115 (cited in note 21).
96
See Robert McC Adams and Hans J. Nissen, The Uruk Countryside: The Natural
Setting of Urban Societies (Chicago 1972).
97
Hayek, The Fatal Conceit at 40 (cited in note 2).
98
See Deirdre N. McCloskey, Bourgeois Dignity: Why Economics Can’t Explain
the Modern World (Chicago 2011).
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